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ABSTRACT 
PSYCHIATRIC activity that CLASSIFICATION IS A PROFOUNDLY IMPORTANT 
directs subsequent treatment decisions, assumptions about etiology, and 
prognostic considerations. While the ideal classification scheme would 
be clear, concise, comprehensively inclusive of, and hospitable to, the en- 
tities under consideration, in practice, all classification systems reflect trade- 
offs and embody flawed structures. Accordingly, it is essential to be fully 
cognizant of the shortcomings, biases, and tacit assumptions of extant 
systemsso that classifications can be improved and so that misrepresenta- 
tions will not be blindly repeated or reproduced. Modern psychiatric clas- 
sification and diagnosis are almost exclusively defined within the context 
of the nomenclature and diagnostic categories of the American Psychiat- 
ric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
This article adapts Giddens’s (1984) theory of “structuration” to explain 
how at least some of the consequences of relying on the DSMfor classifica- 
tion result in unexamined conditions of its use and unintentionally repro- 
duced its underlying assumptions. This article uses the DSMto explicate 
agency in structuration theory and structuration theory to illuminate the 
structure and use of the DSM. The discussion suggests that Mouzelis’s 
(1995) four-fold duality-dualism typology, by empowering the agent not 
only virtually but in actuality, is a necessary and salutary modification of 
structuration theory. Finally, it will be suggested that several prominent 
issues and concerns in psychiatric nosology resonate profoundlywith those 
that have concerned, and continue to interest, library classificationists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Classifying (understood most broadly as arranging or grouping phe- 
nomena on the basis of some system or principle) is fundamental to, and 
underlies, all human thought (see, for example, Svenonius, 1983) and is 
thus an indispensable tool for understanding contemporaiy knowledge 
structures as well as their era-specific historical place and development. 
Classification is both the scientific origin and an arena of ongoing evolu- 
tion, evaluation, and contention for the development of systematic knowl- 
edge. All classifications of knowledge, including library classifications and 
psychiatric nosologies, have been objects of contention because they in- 
eluctably harbor tacit presuppositions of all kinds-e.g., scientific, socio- 
cultural, practical, and ideological, to name but a few. 
The ideal classification scheme would be clear, concise, and compre- 
hensively inclusive of, or hospitable to, the entities and to the approaches 
to classifjmg the entities under consideration. Obviously, realizing such a 
classification is impossible. Thus, all attempts to classify reflect, to some 
degree, trade-offs, compromises, biases of omission and/or commission, 
possibilities, impossibilities, successes, and failures. Because an ideal clas- 
sification is impossible, it becomes essential to be fully cogniLant of the 
shortcomings, biases, and tacit assumptions of extant systems so that clas- 
sifications can be improved and so that problems will not be repeated 
blindly or reproduced. This discussion is an attempt to contribute to that 
project. 
This article elaborates on a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
operation of the official diagnostic classification system within the mental 
health professions. However, it is perhaps unremarkable that many of the 
most prominent issues and concerns of psychiatric nosologists resonate 
with those that have concerned, and continue to interest, library 
classificationists. The birth of psychiatry (as well as of library and infor- 
mation science [LIS]) was characterized by the introduction of classifica- 
tions with a three-fold purpose (Pichot, 1986)-i.e., social, scientific, and 
pragmatic: “The early psychiatric nosology tried simultaneously to attain 
these three goals. Basic to this position was the conviction that, if the 
classification was ‘natural,’ i.e., scientific, it was at the same time the most 
pragmatic” (p. 63). 
Compare the above assertion to Bliss’s resolutely held conviction that 
the library classification that best mirrors the scientific and educational 
consensus would also be the most useful to library patrons (see, for ex- 
ample, Bliss, 1929). Clearly, the status and validity of the warrants, if any, 
that underwrite classification schemes are a source of ongoing contro- 
versy. 
Critical, recurring, and LIS-relevant issues in the history of psychiat- 
ric classification include the following (see, for example, Freedman, 
Silverman, Brotman, & Hutson, 1986). First, what is classified in a 
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psychiatric nosology-disease, disorder, syndrome, individual patients, or 
patient/client groups? This problem of identifying the unit or object of 
classification has its parallel in librarianship with the problem of distin- 
guishing, descriptively, among the work, book, or manifestation. 
Second, for whom is the classification scheme created? Is it for the 
researcher, mental health practitioner, or the courts? In other words, 
there are ongoing concerns with the audience for, and purpose of, the 
psychiatric classification. In LIS, classifications have traditionally been 
constructed for use by librarians but recently, with the advent especially of 
online public access catalogs, it has become increasingly clear that classifi- 
cation schemes need to be useful to the patron or end-user as well. 
Third, there are concerns about the social inputs and consequences 
of classifications in terms of which fashions, societal trends, or pressures 
influence (or bias) the categories of a classification and of how types of 
knowledge (and people) get represented (and obliterated). Because of 
the relatively compelling economic and political implications of psychiat- 
ric classification (and, conversely, of the seeming absence of such ramifi- 
cations with classifications of library materials), such sociocultural and 
ethical concerns have received far less attention in library science than in 
psychiatry. 
Fourth, two related, common, and recurring themes in the history of 
psychiatric nosology arise directly from its ineluctable subjectivity: lump- 
ing versus splitting and the categorical/hierarchical versus dimensional 
(or, in library and information science terms, faceted) approach to classi- 
fication construction (Mack, Forman, Brown, &Frances, 1994). The num- 
ber and granularity of categories, and whether they can be considered 
discrete isolatable entities, are ongoing and potentially insoluble prob- 
lems for both psychiatry and library science. These issues concern the 
epistemic status of our classifications and the distinctions they make and 
have equal applicability both to the classification of diseases/disorders in 
patients and to that of subjects/topics in LIS materials. 
Finally, perhaps most symptomatically, both disciplines have been 
deeply concerned with the consistently inconsistent manner in which their 
classifications have been applied. In psychiatry this concern goes under 
the name of inter-rater unreliability, while in LIS it has been referred to as 
inter-indexer inconsistency. The intractability of this vexatious problem 
in both professions suggests their foundational relevance to each other. 
Thus, it can now be readily appreciated that the study of psychiatric 
classification has much to offer library classification in terms of the rel- 
evance of, and overlap among, common and recurring themes. This ar- 
ticle will therefore exploit the sociological-sensitive research about the 
former to frame and illuminate the latter. 
This article will focus on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (hereafter the DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IVwill be collectively 
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referred to either as the DSMs or as the collective singular, the manual, 
unless otherwise indicated). The DSMs comprise the official nomencla- 
ture and classification system of the American Psychiatric Association and 
as such delineate the boundaries within which psychiatry claims epistemic 
and professional authority (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; McCarthey & Gerring, 
1994). However, the DSMs reflect a compromise of interests. While their 
primary goal is the pragmatic one of clinical utility, their underlying struc- 
tures reflect not only (or even primarily) researchers and clinicians, but 
also the interests of lawyers, statisticians, epidemiologists, insurers, and 
disability claims personnel, among others. Accordingly, many decisions 
were made on the extra-clinical and non-empirical basis of expert consen- 
sus (Blashfield, 1984; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992) in the absence of empirical 
data. The DSMs are documents of mixed origins and conflicting purposes, 
based partly on scientific interests but also reflecting other clearly politi- 
cal and social (including professional) concerns. 
While the DSMs have been the object of intense scrutiny, especially 
scientific, philosophical, and linguistic (see, for example, the contribu- 
tions in Sadler, Wiggins, & Schwartz, 1994), they have not as yet been read 
from a “structurational” perspective. The purpose of this article is to ana- 
lyze the DSMs by employing Giddens’s theory of “structuration.” 
This discussion will begin with an outline of the major tenets of 
structuration theory, highlighting those principles especially applicable 
to classification in general and to diagnostic identification in particular. 
This will be followed by a close structured reading of two situated activi- 
ties related to the development and use of the DSMs. To illustrate the 
analysis of strategic conduct,’ I will reread, from a “structurational” per- 
spective, McCarthey’s (1991) review of the use made of DSM-111by one 
child psychiatrist in her hospital-based clinical practice. This will be com- 
pared to the article with McCarthey and Gerring (1994) in which the child 
psychiatrist of the 1991 article, as a co-author, rhetorically analyzes the 
sociopolitically motivated revision process leading to DSM-IV 
This comparative analysis will illustrate an important weakness of 
Giddens’s duality of structural theoretical framework and the utility, at 
least in terms of the analysis of strategic conduct, of maintaining the dual- 
ity-dualism distinction. Briefly, Giddens’s structuration theory simply does 
not exhaust the types of relationships that actors have toward rules, re- 
sources, and social objects, such as classifications. In fact, opting, as 
Giddens does, for subject/object duality conflates agency and structure 
so that the possibility for actors to distance themselves from social resources 
to view, and orient toward, them strategically is severely curtailed, contra- 
dicting his useful distinction between institutional and strategic conduct 
analysis. In effect, this limitation in Giddens’s duality-of-structure notion 
limits the ability to distinguish the effects of classifications on classifiers 
and classificationists from those of the latter on the former. 
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STRUCTURATIONTHEORY 
Giddens’s structuration theory is especially useful in attempting to 
understand the social context and consequences of classification. 
Structuration theory is concerned with the conditions governing the con- 
tinuity or transmutation of structures and therefore the (re) production 
of social systems (Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1993, 1995). 
Basic concepts of structuration theory especially relevant to this dis- 
cussion can be adumbrated as follows:3 
1. The duality of structure refers to the fact that social structures are 
simultaneously produced and modified by human agents and are used 
as resources; structures are dual in the sense that they are both the 
medium and outcome of the interactions and institutions they recur- 
sively organize. 
2. 	Structure is a virtual order of rules and resources that exists only when 
instantiated in interaction and simultaneously both constrains and 
enables knowledgeable and skilled human agency. Conversely, sys- 
tems are reproduced relations between actors, organized as regular/ 
routine social practices; systems are the observable patterns of social 
interaction and can be said to exhibit, rather than have, structures or 
structural properties. 
3. 	Modalities of structuration are rules that guide action (normative and 
interpretative) and facilities that empower action (authoritative/po- 
litical and allocative/economic resources). Modalities (i.e., interpre- 
tative schemes, norms, and resources) are understood to be drawn 
upon by actors in the production of meaningful interaction: commu- 
nication, sanctions, and power while, simultaneously, they are the re- 
productive media of the structural components of interaction systems: 
structures of signification, legitimation, and domination. The ana- 
lytic significance of the modalities is that they provide the coupling 
elements whereby the analysis of interaction is linked to the 
(re) production of the structural components of social systems. 
Critics of Giddens’s explication of structure (see, for example, Ar- 
cher, 1982; Ldyder, 1987, 1990) accuse him of obscuring the ontological 
status of structures. Because Giddens claims that structures exist only 
when instantiated in human activity, they reason that structures must be 
recreated anew each time. In other words, structures are created by hu- 
man agency but must pre-exist any given actor’s appropriation of them as 
resources in activity. However, supporters of Giddens have suggested that 
such criticisms exaggerate this difficulty by focusing almost exclusively on 
structures as necessarily instantiated in action, neglecting their continuity 
as “memory trace^"^ (Giddens, 1984, p. 17). 
However, there is a more serious problem with Giddens’s concept of 
duality of structure. It conflates agency with structure and, in doing so, 
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simply does not address all the important relationships between agents 
and the rules and resources that comprise social objects (Mouzelis, 1995) .’ 
As we will see when examining a psychiatrist’s use of the manual, by main- 
taining the duality-dualism distinction, agency can be better theorized 
both sociologically and critically. It is essential for agents to be able to 
distance themselves from rules so that we can account for their strategic 
use (and possible transformation) .” 
THEDiag-nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
The Diagnostic and Statistzcal Manual of Mmtal Disorders is the official 
classification system of mental disorders published by the American Psy- 
chiatric Association. The third edition of the DSM (DSM-III)was pub- 
lished in 1980, was revised (IXM-III-R) in 1987, and the fourth edition 
( D S M - w  was published in 1994. It can be considered a charter docu- 
ment in that it “establishes an organizing framework that specifies what is 
significant and draws people’s attention to certain rules and relationships. 
. . . defines as authoritative certain ways of seeing and deflects attention 
away from other ways . . . stabilizes a particular reality and sets the terms 
for future discussions” (McCarthey, 1991, p. 359). 
Since 1980, the DSMs profoundly influenced the way in which the 
mental health field defines itself, the way in which it conducts its clinical 
and research work, the way it educates and socializes new professionals 
entering the field, and they have shaped legal and financial arrangements, 
including which treatments are eligible for insurance reimbursement 
(McCarthey & Gerring, 1994). Moreover, through the manual, a rela- 
tively small group of closely knit psychiatrists, known as the neo- 
Kraepelinians (Blashfield, 1984; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992) ,7 has attempted 
to accomplish three other things. 
The primary goal of the neo- Kraepelinians is to assert the primacy 
and dominance of the biomedical model in the mental health field. There 
are at least two competing and contradictory models that have dominated 
psychiatry. The first, the biomedical-empirical model, comprises two pri- 
mary assumptions. First, there are real discrete entities to which disease 
labels such as “dysthymia,” “schizophrenia,” or “attention deficit disorder” 
ought legitimately to be applied. These disorders are seen as generic and 
applicable across cultures, and there is the related assumption of underly- 
ing behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction: the disturbance 
is not to be located in the relationship between the individual and society. 
Second, the model employs the assumption of specific etiology, which in 
medicine states that diseases are caused by a single biological factor. That 
assumption has been modified in psychiatry to include patterns of mul- 
tiple, discrete, and interacting etiological factors: biological, psychologi- 
cal, genetic, environmental, and/or social. Because these etiological fac- 
tors are not well understood, the DSMs have adopted a fully or purely 
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descriptive approach: they attempt to describe comprehensively the mani- 
festations of disease-i.e., they are intended to be atheoretical as regards 
the etiology of mental disorder. 
The second model is hermeneutic-intuitive and fundamentally evalu- 
ative. The mentally ill patient is seen as an individual whose symptoms 
have meaning particular to him or her. In this model, the focus is less on 
distinguishing, describing, and classifying symptoms as manifestations of 
some unknown (and heretofore unknowable) underlying disease process, 
than on the meanings that those symptoms have for the individual. Men- 
tal health professionals, working within the hermeneutic model (many 
with psychodynamic and psychoanalytic orientations), understand the pa- 
tient as an individual with a “story to tell” that must be understood and 
explained, while those working within the biomedical model see the indi- 
vidual as a member of a group with impairments to be explained. A 
psychiatrist’s choice of perspective, which is often taken without aware- 
ness but which has profound ramifications for how the patient is concep- 
tualized, is a result of personality, education, interests, and situational and 
professional pressures, a point that has important implications for this 
argument. 
By imposing the biomedical model on mental health classification, 
this small group of psychiatric researchers (who are, most importantly, 
not clinicians) has attempted to accomplish two other more exclusively 
professional goals:’ (1) to achieve superiority over neighboring non-medical 
disciplines within the mental health field; and (2) to strengthen their 
affiliation and to achieve parity with other medical specialties (Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992; McCarthey, 1991; McCarthey & Gerring, 1994). 
The publication of DSM-111has often been referred to as a landmark 
event and a major scientific achievement (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). Ac-
cording to Blashfield (1984), four major changes were made between 
DSM-z DSM-II, and DSM-III and beyond: “ ( 1) the use of diagnostic crite- 
ria; (2) a multiaxial approach to patient evaluation; (3) expanded de- 
scriptive information; and (4) a reorganization of the diagnostic catego- 
ries” (p. 112). However, these diagnostic systems were, and are, contro- 
versial. Criticism has come from a wide variety of perspectives, some fo- 
cusing on specific diagnostic entities and categories and others on broader 
conceptual issues, such as diagnostic boundary problems and the implica- 
tions of a categorical classification for the measurement of comorbidity 
(Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995). Without undertaking the impossible 
task of reviewing all critiques of the DSMs, three recurrent and important 
ones will be highlighted below. 
One of the major criticisms of these diagnostic manuals is the focus 
on the individual, its individualistic metaphysics: “minds reside in brains, 
which in turn reside in individual persons. Minds, and subsequently men- 
tal disorders, do not reside in the social world” (Sadler & Hulgus, 1994, 
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p. 262). The underlying assumption is unrealistic in that all psychiatric 
disorders (in fact, all human experience) are deeply embedded in social, 
community, or family networks (see, for example, the essays in Sadler, 
M.’iggins,& Schwartz, 1994). This underlying structural principle under- 
mines the usefulness of the DSM’s multiaxial structure (especially with 
regard to axes IV and V) at least as it is currently constructed. 
The second m?jor area of criticism has been most strongly voiced by 
psychoanalysts and other dynamically oriented psychodiagnosticians. It 
focuses on the historical emptiness in theDSM (McHugh & Slavney,1983), 
claiming that they largely ignore the life story of the person: “The etio- 
logical, clinical, and practical significance of these [historical events such 
asjob loss, catastrophic loss of loved ones, marital discord, and other stress- 
ful life events] and other life events in the patient’s past are pushed into 
the nosological background” (Sadler & Hulgus, 1994, p. 262). 
This fundamental disregard for the temporal and contextual dimen- 
sions of lived experience tends to reify or naturalize diagnostic categories. 
Instead of seeing DSM nosological entities as potentially useful abstrac- 
tions, clinicians are encouraged to see their patients in terms of-and as 
being coextensive with-concrete diseases. Giddens (1984) talks about 
reification in a manner particularly apposite to classifications: 
The concept [reification] should not be understood simply to refer 
to properties of social systems which are “objectively given” so far as 
specific, situated actors are concerned. Rather, it should be seen as 
referring to forms of discourse which treat such properties as “objec- 
tively given” in  the same way as are natural phenomena. That is to 
say, reified discourse refers to the “facticity” with which social phe- 
noniena confront individual actors in such a way as to ignore how 
they are produced and  reproduced through human agency. 
Reification thus should not be interpreted to mean “thing-like” in 
such a connotation; it concerns, rather, the consequences of think-
ing in this kind of fashion . . . .The “reified mode” should be consid- 
ered a form or style of discourse, in which the properties of social 
systems are regarded as having the same fixity as that presumed in 
laws of nature. (p. 180) 
As a result, a vast literature exemplifying the vital relevance of recent and 
remote historical life events to psychiatric problems, as well as an equally 
vast literature on human development and its pertinence to such prob- 
lems, are excluded from consideration in the IISMs. 
The third, and perhaps most celebrated, problem area in the DSlMs 
has to do with their alleged atheoretical stance toward etiology. However, 
while no overt declaration is made in the manuals, they describe or struc- 
ture diagnostic reality so that some etiological theories are more appli- 
cable or relevant than others (Faust & Miner, 1986). The diagnostic ap- 
proach selects operationalized individualistic signs and symptoms as the 
relevant clinical data, whereas other kinds of contextual and temporally 
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sensitizing data are ignored as classificatorily irrelevant. As Sadler and 
Hulgus (1994) observe: 
This descriptive, syndrome-bound approach to diagnosis fits the needs 
of a biological psychiatry much better than other etiological models 
as, for instance, a family interactional model . . .or a developmental, 
life story approach. . . . Because DSM-111-R [as well as DSM-111and 
DSM-IVj fit biological psychiatry’s theory base better than other psy- 
chosocially oriented therapies, the DSM-111-Rdiagnosis tends to make 
biological conceptualizations of the patient primary and the psycho- 
social secondary. In summary, DSiM-III-R may not state a theory, but 
the metaphysical structure of its classification prefers the theoretical 
bases of descriptive/biological psychiatry. (p. 263) 
STRUCTURATION CLASSIFICATION,THEORY, AND THE DSMs’ 
MODALITIESOF STRUCTURATION 
As has been already stressed, all human action and interaction is in- 
extricably and simultaneously composed of structures of meaning, moral- 
ity, and power. In terms of the modalities of structuration, social practice 
links the realm of human agency with that of social structure. Interpreta- 
tive schemes are standardized shared stocks of knowledge that humans 
draw upon to interpret behavior and events, thereby achieving meaning- 
ful interaction. They are the cognitive means by which each actor makes 
sense of what others say and do. Resources are the means through which 
intentions are realized, goals are accomplished, and power is exercised. 
Norms are the rules governing sanctioned or appropriate conduct, and 
they define the legitimacy of interaction within a locale’s moral order. As 
Orlikowski and Robey (1991) state: “Those three modalities determine 
how the institutional properties of social systems mediate . . . human ac- 
tion and how human action constitutes social structure” (p. 148). 
InterpretativeSchemes 
From the point of view of strategic conduct, human interaction in- 
volves the communication of meaning which is achieved via interpretative 
schemes-i.e., stocks of mutual knowledge that agents draw upon in the 
production and reproduction of interaction. “These form the core of the 
mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sus- 
tained through and in processes of interaction” (Giddens, 1979, p. 83). 
Interpretative schemes do more than merely enable the communication 
of shared meaning; they also serve as media for the imposition of struc- 
tural constraints and affordances. 
From the viewpoint of institutional analysis, interpretative schemes 
comprise structures of signification that represent the social rules that 
enable, inform, and constrain the communication process itself. Thus, in 
any interaction, mutual knowledge does not merely provide background 
for the communication process but is constitutive of it, in part organizing 
it and in part being constituted by the process itself. 
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As such,a diagnostic nosology like the DSMis an interpretative scheme 
that mediates between signification structure and social interaction in the 
form of meaningful communication among researchers, clinicians, pa- 
tients, and such other organizational actors as insurers and government 
agencies. The signification structure in those cases comprises the shared 
rules, concepts, and theories that are drawn upon to make sense and or- 
ganize communication about etiology, diagnosis (including reliability and 
validity issues and concerns), treatment plans, efficacy, and of course 
reimbursability. 
Facilities (&sources) 
From the point of view of strategic action, power enters into human 
interaction by providing the facilities and capabilities to accomplish out- 
comes. For example, the DSMs provide clinicians and researchers with 
categories that determine the applicability of various types of treatments. 
Power is understood here in both its broader meaning as transformative 
capacity-that is, the ability to transform or to affect the social and mate- 
rial world-and in the narrower sense of “power over”-that is, power as 
the domination of some individuals over others. Its use in organizations is 
mediated by the resourcesyJo that agents appropriate within interaction. 
All social systems and institutions are characterized by an irreducible 
asymmetryof resources (involving relations of both autonomy and depen- 
dence), the existing structure of domination is reinforced through the 
use ofthose resources, and it is when the existing asymmetry of resources 
is explicitly challenged or resisted, via what Giddens calls the dialectic of 
control,” that the existing structure of domination may he creatively trans- 
formed. 
This is especially the case with psychiatric diagnoses. For many, if not 
most, of the reasons mentioned above, both those diagnosing or applying 
the classification and those diagnosed may use a diagnosis (or assignment) 
for purposes of their own, purposes for which the nosology was not in- 
tended. Kirk and Kutchins (1992) explain in some detail the use of the 
manual to misdiagnose (both to under- and over-diagnose patients for 
purposes of stigma avoidance or to ensure reimbursability, respectively). 
Several authors (see, for example, Starr 1992; Hacking 1992) have called 
attention to the fact that, while classifications of the natural world are 
one-way relationships in that only people categorize natural objects, 
“ [p] eople, however, have their own ideas about group membership-not 
only ideas but strong sentiments. When institutions classify, therefore, 
they often confront the self-conceptions of the subjects” (Starr, 1992, p. 
158). Nowhere do those concerns, essentially with power, apply more 
problematically than in psychiatric classification. 
Norms 
From the viewpoint of strategic action, norms are organizational rules 
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or more or less binding conventions legitimating appropriate conduct. 
Such moral codes for legitimate conduct are created out of the continu- 
ous use of sanctions by agents in interaction. Norms play an active role in 
the shaping of institutional notions of “correct” behavior, that is, in what 
is to be regarded as vice or virtue, as important or trivial, and as obligatory 
or merely contingent. In this way, the practice of psychiatric diagnosis 
ineluctably involves the communication of a definite set of values (see 
Fulford, 1994, concerning the repolarization of illness and disease in terms 
of a value-based perspective on classification). The practice of diagnosis 
and of consequent classification can then be seen as involving the com- 
munication of notions of what should be, and it is primarily on the basis of 
those notions that sense is made of (or meaning constructed and imposed 
on) what psychiatrically exists. 
From the viewpoint of institutional analysis, norms articulate, con- 
ventionally reproduce, or creatively (usually incrementally) transform es- 
tablished structures of legitimation. The legitimation structure institu- 
tionalizes the reciprocal rights and obligations of social actors and medi- 
ates, through norms and moral codes, the sanctioning of particular ac- 
tions and interactions. Systems of psychiatric classification provide and 
legitimize the categories to which people can be assigned. For example, a 
DSM diagnosis is necessary for reimbursement from insurance companies 
or other third parties for treatment costs. The classification system em- 
bodies norms (such as reliability, validity, and conceptual operationalism) 
that legitimize diagnoses made from within its descriptive biomedical frame- 
work. 
However, the modalities, either from the perspective of strategic con- 
duct or from that of institutional analysis, are only isolatable for analytic 
convenience; in the flow of conduct and institutional life these are inex- 
tricably intertwined in each action and interaction. From an institutional 
perspective, modes of signification, domination (and subordination), and 
legitimation are intersecting dimensions of the wholeness of institutional 
social practice. From the point of view of strategic conduct, any interac- 
tion simultaneously exemplifies “three fundamental elements: its consti- 
tution as meaningful, its constitution as a moral order, and its constitu- 
tion as the operation of relations of power” (Giddens, 1993, p. 110). 
We can now explore, in detail, the use of the DSMs from a 
structurational perspective. A diagnostic classification system, as does all 
classification, exists in and as language (Hodge & Kress, 1993). Once 
inscribed in language, and after legitimizing sociocultural resources are 
mobilized and aligned (i.e., after much necessary, but often invisible, so-
cial and political work is transacted), a classification scheme becomes ca- 
pable of coordinating and controlling action across long durations of time 
and large tracts of space. Moreover, as language, a classification scheme 
can be seen, structurationally, as a set of generative rules and resources 
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which are drawn upon (and, often, in the process, reproduced) in its ap- 
plication, in this case classifying. 
However, to understand the actual operation of such systems, it is 
helpful to go beyond descriptive and conceptual accounts and examine 
the conditions and consequences of its use in actual situated practices. In 
practice, different people will perceive a particular system in a variety of 
ways, and their appropriation of systemic resources will both reflect and 
reproduce their various interests. Moreover, the use of a classification 
systemwill inevitably reflect its unacknowledged conditions and generate 
unintended consequences because, according to structuration theory, ac- 
tors, while inherently knowledgeable, may be unaware of the conditions 
of at least some of their actions and certainly of all the consequences that 
feed forward from previous-and feed back to subsequent-action. 
To illustrate the application of structuration theory to the study of 
diagnostic classification, I will analyze one child psychiatrist’s experience 
with the DSM in her clinical practice, suggesting both that we pay too 
high an analytic price by eliding the subject-object distinction and that to 
re-energize agency in structuration theory, we must allow for dualism, as 
well as for duality subject-object relations. Actors must be permitted to 
stand back and distance themselves from rules, resources, and interactive 
situations for the vitally important, and commonly observed, purposes of 
strategy or monitoring (Mouzelis, 1995). 
STRATEGIC AND THE DSMsONDUCT 
McCarthey (1991) arid McCarthey and Gerring (1994) have provided 
a detailed picture of the use of the manual by the child psychiatrist Gerring, 
who coauthored the 1994 article. In particular, this comparative analysis, 
while certainly not parallel, illustrates how Gerring’s conception of (and, 
by implication, use of) the manual obviously changed over several years. 
The material presented in this section relies heavily on McCarthey’s (1991) 
and McCarthey and Gerring’s (1994) papers, which should be read in the 
original for a detailed and more complete accounting of their research. 
On the one hand, McCarthey (1991) will afford the analysis, from a 
structurational perspective, of the strategic conduct of one child psychia- 
trist to better understand and illustrate the ways in which structures (that 
are virtually present in the classification system) are appropriated and 
drawn upon to constitute social action as meaningful, legitimate, and en- 
abling (and simultaneously constraining), while also being unintention- 
ally reproduced through their appropriation and use. On the other hand, 
McCarthey and Gerring (1994) present the same psychiatrist interacting 
with the manual strategically and critically (however, not clinically). In 
terms of Mouzelis’s duality/dualisrn typology, the former article illustrates 
paradigmatic duality and syntagmatic dualism, while the latter illustrates 
paradigmatic dualism and syntagmatic duality.12 
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McCarthey (1991) used a multi-methodological approach to study the 
epistemological and textual consequences of DSM-111 for the diagnostic 
work of Gerring, who was a child psychiatrist on the staff of a university 
hospital-based rehabilitation team that ministered to children who had 
suffered brain injury. McCarthey’s detailed analysis follows Gerring 
through one case as she conducts interviews and draws her diagnostic 
conclusions. As might be expected, a biological psychiatric model, rather 
than a hermeneutic perspective, is more likely to be adopted (and rein- 
forced) by psychiatrists working in this setting. Moreover, Gerring admit- 
ted to McCarthey that her own training emphasized the biomedical ap- 
proach to studying psychiatric disorders as a result of studying pediatrics 
for years before undertaking her psychiatric training. 
McCarthey presents her analysis in terms of how the manual struc- 
tured and determined the gathering of data, the presentation of data, 
and finally, and most importantly, the analysis of the data that were gath- 
ered and presented in the psychiatrist’s clinical diagnostic evaluations of 
one brain-damaged and comatose patient. McCarthey breaks those down 
into two general areas for analysis. 
The first area concerns “DSM-IZZselectivity” (McCarthey, 1991, p. 365). 
The diagnostic classification determined the type and amount of data that 
were gathered about patients. Thus, while the categories of the manual 
were enabling in that they facilitated the collection of detailed informa- 
tion about some aspects of the patient’s condition, they more problemati- 
cally constrained Gerring from seeing other important data about the 
patient. In terms of the aforementioned structural principles that tacitly 
underlie the manual, the data required to make a DSM diagnosis do not 
include contextual and, for the most part, historical data about people 
(Sadler & Hulgus, 1994). 
The manual assumes that mental disorders are real discrete entities 
that can be identified in patients by their clinical symptoms. Not only did 
the psychiatrist neither speculate as to the underlying meaning of the 
symptoms nor attempt to specify their etiological significance (unknow- 
able in terms of the DSM), she used a highly structured interview sched- 
ule based on, and derived from, the DSM itself. In fact, not surprisingly, 
the schedule is designed to lead specifically and rigidly to a DSM diagno-
sis. We can see, then, that the conditions of its use reproduce the struc- 
tural properties of the DSM. For example, as reported by McCarthey 
(1991): “ I f .  . . [she] found no symptoms for a particular disorder, she 
moved on quickly. However, when her questioning revealed the presence 
of some [DSM-validated] diagnostic criteria for a disorder, she questioned 
. . . further” (p. 366). While Gerring reports feeling frustrated by what 
the manual and the interview schedule leave out, it is not surprising that 
the time constraints she feels-”[tlime is the problem” (McCarthey, 1991, 
p. 368)-are the logical result of using a DSM-based interview schedule 
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that merely reproduces the manual’s lack of concern with temporal is- 
sues. Speeding through the interview looking for “legal” diagnostic crite- 
ria ensures that these, and only these, will be found. 
Moreover, in terms of how the data are presented, the psychiatrist 
evinces her commitment to the biomedical model that tacitly underlies 
the DSM. As McCarthey (199l)points out, the headings that are used 
closely follow the hidden logics of the manual (Fulford, 1994) and the 
manual-based interview schedule. Three pages of the five page report 
that she completes on the patient are devoted to the data elicited from 
using the manual-based interview schedule. Two pages are left for basic 
facts about the patient, information sources, history of the present illness, 
observation of the patient, and family information, as well as other types 
of contextually and historically sensitive information. In more Giddensian 
terminology, she shows relatively little discursive penetration into the con- 
ditions of the perspective that organiLes her clinical reality. And in terms 
of dualism-duality typology, on the paradigmatic level, she relates to the 
DSMdualistically in a taken-for-granted performative way. The instantiation 
of the rules and resources of the DSMare the medium and outcome of its 
use. On the syntagmatic plane, she relates in terms of dualism as some- 
thing external to her over which she has little or no effect or control. 
Most importantly, those aspects of the clinical evaluation suggest an 
acceptance of the belief that DSM, as a classification of mental disorders, 
is atheoretical; it presupposes both pure perception uninfluenced by 
thought, raw facts free of interpretation, and an atheoretical observational 
language. Unfortunately, “there is no perceptual experience that does 
not involve cognitive processing directed by assumptions, no fact that is 
not constituted by theory-guided interpretation of sensory stimuli, and no 
observational language that can describe experience without involving 
some theoretical background, whether explicit or implicit” (Goodman, 
1994,p. 295; for a highly influential treatment of the theory laden-ness of 
observation, see Kuhn, 1970). The problem with an implicit commitment 
to atheoretical description (in addition to its falsity) is that, by accepting 
only those theories (paradoxically, atheorism is of course also a theory) or 
particular worldviews based on descriptive realism, a clinician will only 
consider an unnecessarily restricted range of options when contemplat- 
ing alternative, and perhaps equally valid, conceptions of clinical reality. 
To the extent that such factors operate tacitly or covertly without being 
subject to examination, clinicians will unintentionally further and repro- 
duce the presuppositions that subserve the sectional interests of such he- 
gemonic groups as the neo-Kraepelinians. 
The second, and more important, way in which Gerring relies on the 
DSM is not only to analyze the information that she gathered, but also to 
authorize her specific diagnoses, referred to by McCarthey as “DSM-III-
backed analysis.” In her analysis, Gerring refers to diagnostic criteria and 
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DSM categories in a taken-for-granted manner without explanation. The 
audiences for which this evaluation is intended require DSM-based diag- 
nostic analyses. Only in this legitimized and legitimating nomenclature 
can Gerring authoritatively communicate with the other rehabilitation unit 
medical personnel, other mental health researchers, and insurers and le- 
gal personnel. Thus, her conclusions are validated by the same document 
that generated the type and form of her data. The same document, the 
DSM, determined not only the data and information that were collected 
but also their communication, interpretation, and authority. 
Giddens (1984) would rightly call such a system a reproduction cir- 
cuit: “By circuits of reproduction, I mean fairly clearly defined “tracks” of 
processes which feed back to their source, whether or not such feedback 
is reflexively monitored by agents in specific social positions” (p. 192). 
According to Giddens, these circuits of reproduction are implicated in 
the “stretching” of institutions across time and space. In the case of a 
psychiatrist who gathers data on the basis of the same system of diagnostic 
categories in terms of which she analyzes them, we have a relatively closed 
impermeable circuit in which the structures instantiated in the DSM are 
both the medium and outcome of her practice. 
Subsequent to her work with McCarthey, the psychiatrist Gerring co- 
authored a paper on the revision process leading to DSM-N (McCarthey 
& Gerring, 1994), a paper that evinces a radically different view of the 
DSMfrom the orientation of McCarthey (1991). While not a clinically- 
oriented study like the latter paper, the former offers a rhetorical analysis 
of the DSMs, along the more critical lines of Kirk and Kutchins (1992). 
Specifically, in the 1994 paper, the authors analyze the revision of DSM-111-
R by observing work groups, by textually analyzing documents, and by 
interviewing principals in the revision process. The paper concludes with 
a detailed analysis of work group deliberations about the conception and 
inclusion of a new diagnostic category, BED (Binge Eating Disorder). 
After critically discussing the theoretical and sociopolitical background 
of the DSMs, McCarthey and Gerring (1994) move to a detailed rhetorical 
analysis of the “selling of DSM-IK” Without repeating their argument, 
they bisect the persuasion strategy used to “sell” DSM-Ninto strategic use 
of two rhetorical repertoires. First, the contingent repertoire is used when 
task force leaders attempt to distance themselves from DSM-IVs predeces-
sors. Invoking the rhetoric of contingency allows them to account for 
mistakes made in past revisions in terms of the personalities and biases of 
the individuals involved. 
However, since there is direct and virtually unbroken continuity be- 
tween DSM-Wand its predecessors (in fact, the former can only be dis- 
cussed and understood in terms of the latter), too severe criticism of the 
past would inevitably undermine their current efforts. Consequently, DSM-
Ntask leaders can securely position themselves as being “in a direct line 
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with DSM-IIIand DSM-III-R, by using the empiricist repertoire to describe 
the development of all three manuals” (McCarthey & Gerring, 1994, p. 
166). In what they call the progress of the science repertoire, the false 
steps of past revisions can be “presented as vital stepping stones in the 
increasing adoption of the empirical method by the mental health field, 
as the best and only thing that could have been done under the circum- 
stances” (p. 167). This rhetorical move allows the framers of DSM-IVto 
represent their work as another logical and essential step towards “a time 
when mental disorders will be understood well enough to be classified 
according to their pathogenesis, that is, their causal mechanisms [i.e., 
etiology], rather thanjust according to their symptomatology, as at present” 
(p. 167). 
Finally, on the basis of observations of the deliberations of the BED 
work group, as well as of discussions with the participants, the authors 
draw four conclusions. First, the work group followed a strategy designed 
to present psychiatry as a mature biomedical discipline. Second, work 
group deliberations were shaped by scientific and clinical data, conceived 
as professionalizing concerns. Third, just as the texts themselves are in- 
fluenced and shaped by unacknowledged personal and sociopolitical agen- 
das, so were the work group discussions of BED. For example, “work group 
conversations were shaped by members’ differing assumptions about the 
maturity of the field and the role DSM should play in either stimulating 
new research or slowing change and stabilizing current knowledge in psy- 
chiatry” (p. 171). Finally, they found evidence in the work group delib- 
erations both of the contingent repertoire to describe their predecessors’ 
erroneous work and of the empiricist progress of science repertoire to 
account for their niore scientific work on BED. 
Comparing this rhetorical analysis with the description of the con- 
ventional reproductive rule-following of Gerring in McCarthey ( 1991) 
suggests that a transformation in her orientation to the manual has oc- 
curred. In terms of the four-fold typolo<gy, we see, on the paradigmatic 
level, a movement from duality to dualism-i.e., from a natural- 
performative to a strategic-theoretical Orientation to the rules and resources 
that structure the manual. On the syntagmatic level, there is movement 
in the opposite direction from dualisni to duality-from a situation in 
which the actor is inseparable from, and whose actions constitute, the 
system to one in which the system is perceived as external to the agent. In 
other words, by distancing herself from the manual, rather than merely 
enacting the presuppositions of it, the psychiatrist is able to critically ana- 
lyze and perhaps transform her interactions with it. 
Thus, by examining the perception and use of the manual by a 
psychiatrist over time, the utility (necessity) of-maintaining the duality,’ 
dualism distinction to truly empower the knowledgeable and capable agent 
has, it is hoped, been demonstrated. As Mouzelis (1995) correctly states, 
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if one opts exclusively for a subject/object duality approach, the only 
way of conceiving the relationships between subject and structure is 
to see the latter as medium/outcome-which means conflating 
agency and structure, and eliminating the possibility of actors dis- 
tancing themselves from rules and resources in order to view them 
strategically. (p. 123) 
While Giddens claims that his construal of reflexivity encompasses both 
that of the agent (as social theorist)in the flow of action and that of “the 
institutionalization of an investigative and calculative attitude towards 
generalised conditions of social reproduction” (Giddens, 1993, p. 6) ,  a 
theory of knowledgeable and capable agency must allow the actor the 
necessary distance to strategically “stand back from institutionalized rules 
to be able to attack or defend them or their variously perceived contradic- 
tions and incompatibilities. Consequently, agent-structure dualism, while 
problematic if not rigorously conceptualized, cannot be eliminated from 
structuration theory without paying too high a price, that is without sacri- 
ficing the agent to the constraints and affordances of structure. 
DISCUSSION 
Structuration theory has several theoretical (as well as meta-
theoretical) implications for classification research in general and for con- 
struction of diagnostic classifications in particular. As mentioned earlier, 
structuration theory allows not only for theorizing processes leading to 
change and continuity within theoretical systems but also facilitates theory- 
guided specification of genrrative mechanisms,” processes underlying 
system dynamics that account for their surface manifestations. Such a 
distinction exists in psychiatric classification as the ongoing interlevel de- 
bate between etiological explanation and symptom description. 
Second, not only does structuration theory focus our attention on 
situated practices as constitutive frames for understanding structures, but 
it also maintains that classification is an inherently social practice and, as 
such, cannot be understood without reference to the larger forces in which 
it, as a social practice, is embedded. The manual must be understood not 
only as the official nomenclature and classification of the American Psy- 
chiatric Association but also as a field of competing and intersecting forces, 
including psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, clinical psychologists, clinical so-
cial workers, psychiatric nurses, and insurers, each striving to control its 
ultimate form and content. 
Equally applicable to library classifications, Kwasnik (1993), echoing 
the introduction to DSM-III, states that the DSM, as a conceptual structure 
intended to coordinate and articulate interaction (Schmidt & Bannon, 
1992), is meant to facilitate and further the intradisciplinarily necessary 
functions of providing a common language, an accurate diagnostic tool, 
and a standardized vocabulary. However, she asserts unequivocally that: 
The mandate for [the DSMs were] . . . politically and economically 
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motivated: government agencies, insurance companies, benefits pro- 
grams, and others wanted to be able to differentiate and “tag” patients 
with mental disorders unambiguously for the purpose of reimburse- 
ment, legal action, confinements and so on. (Kwasnik, 1993,p. 64) 
Consequently, to nontrivially understand the development, amplifications, 
and uses of a discipline’s powerful conceptual structures-its official clas- 
sifications-nomenclatures-it is imperative to account for both 
intradisciplinary and professional as well as societal, cultural, and histori- 
cally situated forces and contingencies. As Bowker and Star (1991) said of 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD),an even more widely used 
and thus consequential conceptual scheme, “the list cannot be made ho- 
mogeneous, neutral and appeal to all parties” (p. 77) because different 
categories of developers and users have (often incommensurable) differ- 
ent needs and impose conflicting demands on its design. 
De Grolier (1982), employing the seminal observation of cultural 
anthropologists Durkheim and Mauss (1903,4963) that conceptual classi- 
fication systems depend upon and reflect social conditions, bibliometrically 
investigated Classification structures from medieval times to the present 
as cultural artifacts, and suggests that library classifications both are corre- 
lated with conceptual structures prevailing at their respective times and 
are thus inextricably historically situated. Additionally, Britain (1975) and 
Batty (1969) looked at the cultural context and embeddedness of classifi- 
cation and subject indexing, especially differences between British and 
American classificatory practices. 
Britain (1975) states that there continue to be strongly held, conten- 
tious opposing points of view about, and dissident reactions to, classifica- 
tion as a tool and as the basis for subject analysis precisely because there 
are neither transcultural nor panhistorical acceptance of any consistent 
set of underlying principles. He quotes A. C. Foskett approvingly that 
“practically any classification scheme one would care to examine, far from 
being objective as it should be according to the emphasis of classification 
theorists is likely ‘to reflect both the prejudices of its time and those of its 
author’ [i.e., the classificationist]” (p. 34). 
He rightly concludes that librarianship, being a historically situated 
professional subculture, has “its own ideas, its norms, and its tools . . . 
[which] will always tend to reflect the larger culture ofwhich it is a part-its 
ideas, its laws and mores and even its aberrations” (Britain, 1975, p. 35). 
Batty (1969) asserts that, in addition to such extrinsic (or external) 
factors as the sociopolitical system (e.g., democratic versus oligarchic class 
structure) of a culture, the intrinsic meaning of indexing and classifica- 
tion systems vary and must be understood if such differences are to be 
appreciated rather than judged or blindly repeated. He concludes that: 
To the Western European, classification is an almost inevitable method 
of expression: it seems so natural to order subjects or ideas into 
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groups, each with a group name that therefore allows the further 
collection of groups-as-units into higher classes still. To the Ameri- 
cans, classification has meant only one thing: shelf-“marking and 
parking” . . . . It is not that there is any inability to understand how 
complex numbers are put together, or even how facet theory can be 
used to make a classification scheme: it is rather an inability to un- 
derstand why they should be. [emphasis in original] (Batty, 1969, p.6) 
Clearly, Batty is alluding to deeply held beliefs about the what, why, 
and how of library classification, and not merely to the more superficial 
(and probably more cross-culturally stable) technical abilities of classifiers 
to master any given scheme. 
In sum, what Grob (1991) said of psychiatric nosology can be said of 
all attempts to classify and order, including LIS classificatory activities: 
Classification systems are neither inherently self-evident nor given. 
On the contrary, they emerge from the crucible of human experi- 
ence; change and variability, not immutability, are characteristic. 
Indeed, the ways in which data are organized at various times [and in 
various places] reflect specific historical circumstances. (p.421) 
Nosologies and classificatory schemes are rarely, if ever, etched per- 
manently in stone. They ineluctably grow out of specific historical con- 
texts and reflect the various Zeitgeist of the times and places in which 
they were, and are, developed. 
Reviewing three comprehensive, and currently used, library classifi- 
cations, the Dewey Decimal Classification, Library of Congress Classifica- 
tion, and Bliss Classification, second edition, Langridge (1995) makes the 
apposite and salutary observation that: 
The number, scope, and order of main classes represents a conscious 
or unconsciously held view of the world. . . .Yet all three systems, 
samples of a liberal humanist attitude, look alike when compared 
with Marxist schemes devised for Russia or China or with mediaeval 
schemes. [It seems likely that]. . .changes over long periods of time 
make different classifications appropriate to different epochs. The 
knowledge of the ancient world, the middle ages, and modern times 
are best accommodated by different schemes. (pp. 12-13) 
Programmatically, structuration theory affords the study of library clas- 
sification what it offers the study of the development and use of the con- 
ceptual structures and schemes of any other discipline: discursive pen- 
etration into the sociocultural conditions of the multiple perspectives that 
organize the context within which historically situated practitioners act. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, the inability of Giddens’s structuration theory, at least the 
version of it presented above, to theorize intentional transformative ac- 
tion has an unfortunate and particularly paralyzing relevance to the 
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ongoing revision of a living, yet institutionalized, text such as the manual. 
In general, change is problematic and only some sorts of it are always 
everywhere realistically possible. Unless we maintain the distinction be- 
tween duality and dualism, allowing for agent-structure distanciation, im- 
plications of Giddens’s structuration theory are that only an arbitrarily 
limited range of options will be possible for particular agents, that of pos- 
sible changes only sonie will be known and desired, and that only an unre- 
alistically limited range of those may be realized as the unintended conse- 
quences of agents’ otherwise (but contentless and sterile) knowledgeably 
directed action. While Giddens emphasizes the importance of a critical 
reading and application of theory (see, for example, Giddens, 1984), he 
pays much more attention to the unintended consequences of social re- 
production than to intentional creative transformation, which emphasis 
itself seems an ineluctable (unintended) consequence of his misguided 
and unsuccessful attempt to transcend agent-structure dualism. 
According to New (1994), we intentionally change social structures 
by identifying them, the activities in which they are used, and their role in 
the reproduction of the social system to determine their liability or sus- 
ceptibility to change. Moreover we, as knowledgeable agents, need to 
understand how these social structures simultaneously enable and con- 
strain various position-practices, and how, by offering channels for agents’ 
purposes, those generative rule-resource sets themselves consciously mo- 
tivate. Consequently, New (1994) rightly concludes: 
[el ffective “reflexive appropriation” requires agents to recognise their 
own structural capacity and t o  use it to the full, or act to increase i t .  
. . increasing our understanding of all the “unacknowledged condi- 
tions of action,” which would include unconscious sources of motiva-
tion, is likely to reduce the proportion of unintended consequences. 
. . . The better these are theorised, the more likely that the chosen 
policy will fulfill its [intended] purposes. (p. 203) 
In the final analysis, knowledgeable transformative action presup- 
poses intentionality. Otherwise, we will be left in the ironic and unenvi- 
able position that “society is transformed by‘knowledgeable agents,’ that 
this represents an ‘achievement,’ and that nevertheless these knowledge- 
able agents know not what they do, since they both change and repro- 
duce society by mistake, unintentionally, as a side effect of everyday social 
life” (New, 1994, p. 200). Unless we successfully theorize intentional pro- 
cesses of social change, for example, by acknowledging the situated real- 
ity of agent-structure dualism (or subject-object distance), agents, such as 
the psychiatrists of this paper’s title, are unhappily and unnecessarily re- 
duced to Garfinkel’s “judgmental dopes,” despite Giddens’s protestations 
of knowledgeability, producing invalid diagnoses for seemingly valid orga- 
nizational and professional reasons. 
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NOTES
’ This, of course, is a rather broad transposition of Marx’s celebrated aphorism, “Human 
beings make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing” (cited 
in Cohen 1987, p. 273) .  However, Giddens takes Marx’s point very seriously; in fact, 
one could cogently argue that a large part of the Giddensian project is directed at expli- 
cating the full import of that aphorism. Additionally, throughout the paper the acro- 
nym DSM will he used to refer to various editions of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Dia,mostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
According to structurational analysis it is essential to distinguish between the study of 
structure-agency interdependencies at both the social and systemic levels. Consequently, 
there are two principal ways to study social system properties, each of which is separated 
out by a methodological epoche: 
To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study 
the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements-rules arid resources 
-in their sorial relations. “Structure” here appears as actors’ mobilisation of 
discursive and practical consciousness in social encounters. Institutional 
analysis, on the other hand, places the epoche upon strategic conduct, treat- 
ing rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems 
(Giddens, 1979, p. 80) 
However, the introduction of the duality/dualism typology enables a more nuanced 
interpretation than the binary (and, perforce, reductionistically false) methodological 
bracketing advocated by Giddens. 
’ For full treatments of‘structuration theory, it is essential to read Giddens’s evolving and 
variously nuanced accounts, which can be found in Giddens (1979, 1984, 1993) among 
others. 
According to Cohen (1989), “ structure ‘exists’ in manifest form only when it is instanti- 
ated in social practices. It otherwise persists between instances of social reproduction 
only as ‘memory traces’ sustained by knowledgeable social agents” (p.46). 
Mouzelis (1995, p. 138) correctly observes that: 
“aproper study of the linkages between a micro and a macro approach should 
not take the form 
Institutional Structures (macro level) 
t 
Participants (micro level) 
but the more complex configuration 
Macro Institutional Macro Actors 
Actors 
Micro Institutional x Micro Actors 
Actors 
Simply put, MouLelis’s more complex configuration posits that the consequentiality of 
an actor’s actions for others can he large (macro) or small (micro), whether the actor is 
a single individual or a collective. 
j One of Giddens’s important contributions to social science research is the realization 
that such analysis always involves a double hermeneutic: 
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The intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of 
social science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and 
the metalanguages invented by social scientists; there is a constant “slippage” 
from one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences (Giddens, 
1984, p. 374). 
One of Giddens’s important contributions to social science research is the realization 
that such analysis always involves a double hermenelltic: 
The intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of 
social science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and 
the metalanguages invented by social scientists; there is a constant “slippage” 
from one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences (Giddens, 
1984, p. 374). 
’ The so-called neo-Kraepelinians comprised a rclatively small group of research oriented 
psychiatrist-nosologists,who, in the 1960s and 1970s, promulgated tenets of diagnostic 
classification first advanced by nineteenth century German nosologist, Emil Kraepelin. 
Their credo can be summarized as follows: psychiatry is a branch of medicine and 
should seek to establish scientific know-ledge; psychiatry treats people who are sick, and 
who can be reliably distinguished from those who are well; psychiatry should conceive 
of mental illnesses biologically, as discrete isohtable entities; and classification and di- 
agnosis are important and legitimate arras of research within the biomedical science of 
psychiatry. For detailed treatments ofthe neo-Kraepelinians see, for example, Blashfield 
(1984) and Herman (1978). 
’According to Ahbott (1988), the successful advancement of a profession’s knowledge 
base is central to its jurisdictional strength. He states that: 
the academic knowledge system of a profession generally accomplishes three 
tasks-legitimation, research, and instruction-and in each it shapes the vul- 
nerability of professional jurisdiction to outside interference. Legitimacy 
provides a central foundation forjurisdiction, and its absence provides a cen- 
tral line for attack. . . . The academic knowledge system also provides new 
treatments, diagnoses, and inferences for working professionals; if it fails in 
this function, professional jurisdictions gradually weaken. (pp. 65-67) 
Giddens (1979, 1984, 1993) distinguishes two types ofresources: allocative, arising from 
command over objects and material phenomena, and authoritative, arising from capa- 
bilities to organize and coordinate the activities of social actors. These clearly have 
implications for use of the DSM. For example, allocative resources pertain to the eligi- 
bility of DSM diagnoses for third party reimbursement, while allocative resources refer 
to the power of the I>SM to construct mentally ill identities. 
’” Sewell (1992) makes the useful point that if structures are virtual, then they cannot 
include both rules and resources, and if they include both, they cannot be virtual. Re- 
sources, as media of power, and particularly allocative resources, must exist materially, 
and thus cannot br  considered virtual. Thus, Sewell (1992) suggests that structure should 
refer only to rules or schemas, not to resources, which are better seen as effects of 
structures, as “media animated and shaped by structures, that is, by cultural schemas” 
(p. 11). 

According to Giddens (1984), the dialectic of control is characteriied by “the two-way 

character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); how the less powerful 

manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in estab- 

lished power relationships” (p. 374). 

According to Mouzelis (1995): 

On the syntagmatic level [actual relationships], subject-object dualism refers 
to situations where a subject’s participation in a game does not seriously af-
fect its outcome, whereas duality refers to situations where the opposite is 
true. 
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On the paradigmatic level [virtual linkages], actors can, for strategic/moni- 
toring reasons, distance themselves from rules (paradigmatic dualism); or 
they can use rules in a taken-for-granted manner (paradigmatic duality). (p. 
156) 
Thus, on the one hand, in terms of practice, dualism (separation) connotes little conse- 
quentiality, while duality describes situations wherein the consequences of an actor’s 
practice for others are large and compelling. On the other hand, in terms of the struc- 
tural properties of social practices, duality (closeness) refers to a performative relation- 
ship of actor to object, while dualism describes situations in which actors distance them- 
selves from formal structures for strategic purposes. Only by considering the conse- 
quences of the full range of relationships that actors have with rules and resources at 
both strategic conduct and institutional analytic levels can we fully account for the irre- 
ducible logics of the dispositional, interactive-situational, and positional dimensions of 
social action. 
lYAn admittedly arbitrary overview of social scientific realism posits that knowledge is a 
social product and lacks any sort of secure foundations; that there is a knowable exter- 
nal world; that while the social world is a construction, it is profoundly constrained by a 
specific history that provides agents with the materials for continued reproduction and, 
less frequently, transformation; and that valid social science aims to explain rather than 
predict. As to whether Giddens is a realist, there seems to he little doubt, hut what kind 
of realist he is has been the subject of some debate. Some complain that he emphasizes 
structure over agency, others that he privileges agency over structure, and finally some 
accuse him of merely conflating agency and structure, explaining neither. In addition 
to Mouzelis’s (1995) critique, as presented in this paper, for differing but suggestive 
viewpoints, see, for example, Archer (1982), Layder (1987, 1990),Pawson (1989), the 
collected essays in Bryant &Jary (1991) and Held & Thompson (1989), and finally the 
special issues of Theory, Culture, and Society (1982), 2(2) andJonrnalfor the Theory of Social 
Behavior (1983), 13. 
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